Dynamic trust model for federated identity management by Gao, Hao et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences 
1-1-2010 
Dynamic trust model for federated identity management 
Hao Gao 
University of Wollongong, hg016@uow.edu.au 
Jun Yan 
University of Wollongong, jyan@uow.edu.au 
Yi Mu 
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers 
 Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gao, Hao; Yan, Jun; and Mu, Yi: Dynamic trust model for federated identity management 2010, 55-61. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1734 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Dynamic trust model for federated identity management 
Abstract 
The goal of federated identity management is to allow principals, such as identities and attributes, to be 
shared across trust boundaries based on established policies. Since current Single Sign-On (SSO) 
mechanism excessively relies on the specifications of Circle of Trust (CoT), the need for service 
collaboration from different domains is being addressed on CoT. For the motivating issue of the cross-
domain SSO mechanism, we need an emergent dynamic trust list for calculating the trust parties, thus, 
the CoT specifications require an initial effort on enrolling members automatically to adapt to the 
dynamic open environment. In this paper, we propose a Dynamic Trust Policy Language to support trust 
negotiation. The formal syntax of this language is presented in Backus Naur Form (BNF) based on the 
concept of role membership. We also systematically develop the Dynamic Trust Model (DTM) to allow 
Untrusted SP to join the existing CoT by trust negotiation. Finally, we identify the process and algorithm 
for communication between negotiation entities. 
Keywords 
Dynamic, trust, model, for, federated, identity, management 
Disciplines 
Physical Sciences and Mathematics 
Publication Details 
Gao, H., Yan, J. & Mu, Y. (2010). Dynamic trust model for federated identity management. 4th International 
Conference on Network and System Security, NSS 2010 (pp. 55-61). Piscataway, New Jersey, USA: IEEE. 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/1734 
Dynamic Trust Model for Federated Identity Management
Hao Gao1, Jun Yan1 and Yi Mu2
1School of Information Systems and Technology




Abstract—The goal of federated identity management is
to allow principals, such as identities and attributes, to be
shared across trust boundaries based on established policies.
Since current Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanism excessively
relies on the specifications of Circle of Trust (CoT), the
need for service collaboration from different domains is being
addressed on CoT. For the motivating issue of the cross-domain
SSO mechanism, we need an emergent dynamic trust list
for calculating the trust parties, thus, the CoT specifications
require an initial effort on enrolling members automatically
to adapt to the dynamic open environment. In this paper, we
propose a Dynamic Trust Policy Language to support trust
negotiation. The formal syntax of this language is presented
in Backus Naur Form (BNF) based on the concept of role
membership. We also systematically develop the Dynamic Trust
Model (DTM) to allow Untrusted SP to join the existing CoT by
trust negotiation. Finally, we identify the process and algorithm
for communication between negotiation entities.
Keywords-Federated Identity Management, Dynamic Trust,
Single Sign-On, Circle of Trust
I. INTRODUCTION
Federation has become an emergent concept for current
identity management. The goal of federated identity manage-
ment is to allow principals, such as identities and attributes,
to be shared across trust boundaries based on established
policies. The identity federation enables users of one security
domain to gain access to resources seamlessly from other
domains without repeating login processes. A number of
different frameworks and approaches were presented for
federated identity management, which could be considered
as formal Internet standards or openly published specifi-
cations, such as OASIS SAML, OpenID, ID-FF (Liberty
Alliance Identity Federation Framework), Shibboleth, and
WS-Federation [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Three main actors in a
federation are defined as follows.
• Identity Providers (IdP) : entities that focus on autho-
rization and authentication of users, as well as man-
aging and sharing identity information with various
trusted SPs.
• Service Providers (SP): entities that provide particular
services to users who are authenticated by trusted IdPs.
• Users: principals who are willing to obtain services
from multiple SPs.
Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanism is a popular approach
to reduce repeated login challenges. SSO protocols enable
users to sign in a federated environment once and yet be
able to access several services offered by different SPs.
While SSO service hardly poses any difficulty within a
single administrative domain, there are several problems in
cross-domain scenarios. Firstly, what kind of services could
be trusted? Secondly, how could a service provider trust
identity information from another administrator? Currently,
two entities could establish trust relationship only before
the interactions take place, which means the Circle of Trust
(CoT) should be pre-configured. For the traditional CoT, the
Trust Anchor List (TAL) contains the digital information
about the trustworthiness, such as certificates and public
keys. Protocol messages whose digital signatures are valid
within the TAL are accepted to interact with other entities
in the particular CoT. This means that if the certificate
is not in the TAL, the entity will not be trustworthy. We
could consider that TAL is static because the trust does not
evolve any other unknown reasons. Thus, this pre-configured
TAL model is obviously not suitable for the dynamic open
environment.
In order to reduce repeated login activities, users could
login to any service once to gain access to other services
within the static CoT by SSO mechanism. However, some-
times, the target service that users demand to access is not
in the particular CoT associated with the SSO mechanism.
Dynamic trust circle enables any untrusted SP to negotiate
with the IdP within the circle. Any untrusted party could join
and quit the trust circle automatically after trustworthiness
is identified. In an effort to develop a more convenient
approach for users to gain access to various services, we
present a new trust model called Dynamic Trust Model
(DTM). Unlike existing CoT approach, DTM allows any un-
trusted SP to join the particular CoT automatically if that SP
is satisfied with policies pre-configured in the administrator
of the CoT. This approach to identity management allows
users to access any demanded SP by login once if the nego-
tiation between that SP and user’s trusted IdP is successful.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• A dynamic trust policy language is developed, which
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extends the RT family of policy languages [1] to
support trust negotiation. The formal syntax for this
language is presented in Backus Naur Form (BNF)
based on the concept of role membership. A detailed
example is also provided to demonstrate the flexibility
and usability of this policy language.
• The Dynamic Trust Model is systematically developed
to allow untrusted SP to join the existing CoT by
negotiation. The protocol is provided to describe the
process of trustworthiness establishment.
• The process and algorithm of the negotiation methods
are identified, which extends the Web Service Trust
(WS-Trust) language, to support communication be-
tween different entities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present
the overview of the system model in Section 2. Then, we
develop a dynamic trust policy language,and provide the
syntax language in Section 3. After that, DTM, the protocol,
and algorithms are presented in section 4, followed by the
discussion of the related works in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude our paper and outline our future work in Section
6.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a user-requested trust negoti-
ation model in order to enable a simple user to access an
untrusted SP by SSO.
Model.png
Figure 1. System Model
As shown in Figure 1, this negotiation is presented
between the trusted IdP and an untrusted SP. Generally, in
a CoT, there are many trusted principles such as service
providers, identity providers, delegators, and users. For the
purpose of simplicity, in our model, we assume that there is
only one IdP in the CoT.
Unfortunately, the traditional CoT, as we known, is static
because all the trust relationships are pre-configured in TAL.
In this kind of trust circle, users could login to any services
which are already trusted by their identities in SSO use case.
However, they can not access their demanded services by the
same identities if such services are not in the CoT. Therefore,
the trust negotiation between untrusted SP and the particular
trust circle is needed. In our model, the negotiation between
the CoT and the untrusted SP is established to enable such
untrusted SP to join the circle temporarily.
III. POLICY LANGUAGE
In this section, we present the dynamic trust policy lan-
guage, which extends the Attribute-based Trust Negotiation
Language (ATNL) to support dynamic trust management for
SSO. ATNL, a formal language for specifying credentials
and policies, is based on RT family of trust management
language [2].RT language introduces the role membership
to define the semantics for many access policies. There are
two basic levels in RT languages: RT0 and RT1. RT0 sim-
ply identifies the name of the role and relationships between
principles and roles. There are four types of role definitions:
simple member, simple containment, linking containment,
and intersection containment. RT1 extends RT0 by adding
additional parameters to the definitions of the roles.
A. Dynamic Trust Policy Language and Syntax
Dynamic trust policy language consists of four main
parts to describe the policy which is pre-set in a particular
principal. The syntax of the policy language is represented
in BNF (Backus Naur Form). We present a policy-setting
to explain all the negotiated information. The details and
syntaxes of each part are illustrated in the following text.
1. Policy-setting: the policy of a particular principal con-





<policy-setting>::=<set of policy-issuer><set of
policy-stmt><set of credential><set of trust index
number>
2. Policy-issuer: policy-issuer takes the form:
<prin>.<p-issuer-type>
The element p-issuer-type contains three different at-




3. Policy-stmt: policy-stmt takes the form:
<policy-head>←<policy-body>
::necessary/un-necessary
Policy-head and policy-body follow the RT structure.
A policy-stmt can be either necessary or un-necessary.
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Syntax 3: policy-stmt
<policy-stmt>::=<policy-head> “ ← ” <policy-body> “::”(“necessary”|“un-necessary”)
<policy-head>::=<role>
<policy-body>::=<prin>“.”<role-term> | <p-linking> | <p-intersection>
<role>::=<prin>“.”<role-term>




Figure 2. Syntax for policy-stmt
These two types will affect the trust negotiation pro-
cesses. The necessary policy-stmt means that if any
entities demand to establish the trust relationship with
this entity, they must provide the credentials to match
all this kind of statement. The un-necessary policy-
stmt means that if any entities demand to establish
the trust relationship with this entity, depending on the
trust index number, they do not have to provide all the
credentials to match this kind of statement.
4. Credential: a credential can be either a simple member
credential or a simple containment credential. These
two kinds of definitions are the basic types presented
in RT language. A simple member credential takes
the form: KA.R ← KD, which means principle
KA considers principal KD to be a member of role
KA.R. A simple containment credential takes the form:
KA.R ← KB .R1 where principal KA defines the role
KA.R to contain all members of KB .R1 which is
defined by KB .
Syntax 4: credential
<credential>::=<role> “ ← ”(<prin> | <role>)
5. Trust index number: trust index is the number N,
0 ≤ N ≤ 1, which presents the acceptable proportion
of provided credentials. This number describes the
proportion of unnecessary policies with which the nego-
tiator should be satisfied. For example, if the trust index
number is 0.8, 80 percent of “un-necessary” policies
should be satisfied by negotiator’s credentials to make
sure the negotiation process is successful. This number
presents the lowest acceptable value of a particular trust
level which is decided by the IdP or SP, which means
the bigger N is, the higher trust level is. In addition,
this number could make the negotiation more flexible,
the negotiator could partly disclosure the credentials to
satisfy the policies in stead of matching the policies
very strictly.
B. An Example
We present an example to explain how the dynamic trust
policy language is deployed in particular principals. The two
negotiators are MyUniversity, an identity provider of the
trust domain, and an untrusted service provider GoodLive.
A principal Alex signed in one of the services in the trust
domain which is authorized by MyUniversity. At this time,
Alex is willing to access another service GoodLive that
is not in this trust domain. The GoodLive service is an
accommodation service which is not in MyUniversity’s trust
circle.
From GoodLive’s perspective, Goodlive offers a per-
mission to anyone who satisfies its policy. To satisfy its
policy, the requestor should be certified as an undergraduate
informatics student by any level 5 university (authorized by
government), and the requestor should be more than 18 years
old (The age should be shown on driver license or passport).
Furthermore, GoodLive holds many additional credentials.
For example, Goodlive is a Realestate service member and
a good service provider certified by Realestate.
From MyUniversity’s perspective, MyUniversity only
conditionally allows some service providers to join its trust
circle. The service provider should be a Realestate member
and a good service provider certified by Realestate as
well. MyUniversity also holds Alex’s credentials when Alex
registered in MyUniversity.
The policy settings in MyUniversity and GoodLive are
shown in Figure 3 and 4.
IV. DYNAMIC TRUST MODEL AND PROTOCOL
A. DTM
As depicted in Figure 5, the Trust Engines are presented
on both sides of Identity Provider and Untrusted Service
Provider. All information for the negotiation is transmitted
between Trust Engines.
Generally, for the traditional CoT, the TAL is pre-
configured in every entity before interactions take place.
TAL contains the digital information about the trustworthi-
ness, such as certificates and public keys. Protocol messages
whose digital signatures are valid within the TAL are ac-
cepted to interact with other entities in the particular CoT.
This means if the certificate is not in the TAL, the entity will
not be trustworthy. We could consider that TAL is static







← realestate.member ⋂ realestate.goodserviceprovider :: necessary
credentials:
• c1: gov.unilevel (val=5) ← MyUniversity
• c2: MyUniversity.student (program=‘informatics’, level=‘undergraduate’ ) ← Alex
• c3: gov.passport (DoB=16/08/1990) ← Alex
trust index number: 1





• p1: GoodLive.prefstudent ← GoodLive.prefUni.student (program=informatics,
level=undergraduate)
⋂
GoodLive.DoB (val<‘01/01/1991’) :: necessary
• p2: GoodLive.prefUni ← gov.unilevel (val=5) :: necessary
• p3: GoodLive.DoB (val=x) ← RTA.driverlicense (DoB=x) :: un-necessary
• p4: GoodLive.DoB (val=x) ← gov.passport (DoB=x) :: un-necessary
credentials:
• c1: realestate.member ← GoodLive
• c2: realestate.goodserviceprovider ← GoodLive
trust index number: 0.8
Figure 4. GoodLive’s policy.
and any other unknown reasons. Thus, this pre-configured
TAL model is obviously not suitable for the dynamic open
environment.
Instead of the static TAL, we present an advanced Dy-
namic Trust List (DTL) which is based on the negotiation
between entities. Any untrusted entities could join the DTL
if they are considered to be trustworthy by the identity
provider of the CoT. DTL could contain more information
about the entities. The DTL will be updated automatically
under special events, such as the completion of a success-
ful negotiation. The trust engine, a logic block, processes
the trust information between external entities and internal
parties. This logic component is also responsible for the
management of DTL. The trustworthiness between entities
is established based on policies. Thus the trust engine makes
the decision whether the external entities satisfy the policy
that is preset in internal entity. If the credentials, which are
held in the external entity, satisfy that policy, the external
entity will be added into the DTL of the internal party;
otherwise, it will be refused to join the CoT.
Figure 5. Dynamic Trust Model
B. Protocol
As soon as the trust is established between the internal
identity provider and the external service provider, the SP
is considered as the trust entity and joins the DTL which is
configured in internal IdP. The details of the trust negotiation
protocol, as shown in Figure 6, are as follows.
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Figure 6. Protocol for trust negotiation
Step 1: A user logs in to the service by her/his identity and
password which are authorized by the internal identity
provider.
Step 2: The internal identity provider passes the user’s creden-
tials on to the user. Generally, at this time, the user
could single sign on other trusted services in the CoT
by using that authorized credentials.
Step 3: The user uses the credentials authorized by the in-
ternal identity provider to make a request to access
the demanded service provider which is the external
untrusted service provider.
Step 4: The external untrusted SP sends a trust negotiation
request to the internal IdP. The policy content and
other trust negotiation information are contained in the
request message.
Step 5: The internal IdP responds to the external SP with a
message containing the parameters, credentials, and
further negotiation requests including the IdP’s policy
statement.
Step 6: The external SP makes the decision whether the IdP
could be trusted, and responds to IdP with its own
credentials.
Step 7: The internal IdP makes the decision whether the
external SP could be trusted and notifies the user about
the decision. If the trust relationship is established
between them, the external SP will join the DTL and
allow that particular user to use its service. Otherwise,
that SP will refuse the user to access.
In order to implement the trust negotiation between the
internal IdP and external SP, we present a function SATISFY
(k, K) to be sent in the security token messages. SATISFY
(k, K) represents whether two entities k and K mutually
satisfy the respective policies. The security token message
with SATISFY function consists of four main parts: target,
policy issuer, policy statement, and value.
• Target: the entity who is the target entity to be satisfied
with the policy of requestor.
• Policy Issuer: the entity who sent SATISFY request
message.
• Policy Statement: the content of the policy.
• Value: 00 or 01 or10. If entity k is satisfied with policy
of K, the value is 01, otherwise is 00. If entity K is
satisfied with policy of k, the value is 10, otherwise
is 00.
C. Process and Algorithm
To implement the protocol above, we choose Web Service
Trust (WS-Trust) language to send and receive messages
between different entities. Two algorithms are presented to
describe how to calculate the value of SATISFY (k, K) in
the Trust Engine. The processes of interaction between the
external SP and the internal IdP are described in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Process of dynamic trust model
The process 1 in Figure 7, the external SP sends a
trust negotiation request to the internal IdP. The format of








The general mechanisms of WS-Trust that are defined
for requesting and returning security tokens are extensible.
A request is initiated with a <wst:RequestSATISFY(k,K)>
that identifies the details of the request; and it could contain
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initial negotiation or challenge information. Every request
needs a response message. A response is returned with a
<wst:RequestSATISFY(k,K) Response> that contains addi-
tional negotiation or challenge information. For example, the
process 2 in Figure 7, a response message has to be returned
to the external SP. Additional negotiation information could
be contained in element <challenge> as described WS-Trust
specification.
The Trust Engine will manage the value of SATISFY
(k,K) to establish the trust relationship between k and K.
As the target is different, value(k)and value(K) are recieved
from different entities. If the value (k) +value (K) =11, the
external SP will be added into the DTL of the internal IdP.
The algorithms for calculating the value of SATISFY (k,
K) in the Trust Engine are described as follows.
Algorithm 1: for calculating the value of SAT-
ISFY(k,K)
Input: Target(k), Policy Issuer(policy-issuer),
Policy Statement(policy-stmt)
1) Start.
2) Search credentials Cn from target to match
the policy-stmt. If matched credentials are
found, output value (k/K) =01, go to Algo-
rithm 2.
3) If matched credentials are not found, output
value (k/K) =00, go to process 4.
Algorithm 2: for decision of negotiation
Input: value (k), value (K)
1) If value (k) or value (K) is empty, go to
process 3.
2) If value (k) + value (K) = 11, go to process
5.
V. RELATED WORK
The concept of CoT is recognized as part of the federated
identity vision by the Liberty Alliance Federation Frame-
work (ID-FF) [3]. They have developed specifications and
guidelines for organizations to establish a legally binding
CoT. Similar federated identity management approaches
which can be accomplished by means of formal Internet
standards are presented, such as OASIS’s Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) [4], Shibboleth [5], OpenID
[6], or WS-Federation [7]. SAML, which is highly flexible,
defines an XML based framework to allow the exchange of
security assertions between entities. Shibboleth is normally
used in educational environments; and the trust between
different domains is implemented by agreement of common
rules and contracts based on PKI infrastructure. OpenID is
a decentralized framework for user-centric digital identity;
thus, the specification could only cover a narrow range of
SSO use cases. WS-Federation, is an identity federation
specification which allows different domains to negotiate
information on identities or attributes. These frameworks
only rely on the static CoT, even some of them are flexible.
A related area of work is automated trust negotiation
which was introduced by Winsborough et al. [8]. The trust
negotiation policy language is based on RT [9], which is
a family of Role-base Trust-management language. J. Li
and N. Li [10] have developed an Attribute-based Trust
Negotiation Language (ATNL) for specifying credentials and
policies. ATNL allows one to specify policies that govern the
disclosure of partial information about a sensitive attribute.
These works in the area of automated trust negotiation are
considerable contributive. However, they did not concern
about the dynamic trust in federated identity management.
Adam J. Lee and T. Yu [11] introduced a dynamic trust
model which is a first step to consist vertical trust and hori-
zontal trust. Composite Trust Model (CTM), a flexible policy
language, was developed to allow arbitrary composition of
horizontal and vertical trust metrics. Cross-domain resource
sharing fundamentally depends on digital credentials for
access control. Extensive research has been done in the
areas of trust management [12], [13] and distributed proofs
[14], [15]. F. Almenarez and P. Arias [16] also introduced
reputation system into a dynamic trust model. They extended
SAML standard in order to facilitate the creation of feder-
ation relationships in a secure dynamic way between prior
unknown parties. These works paid more attention on the
reputations. However, to introduce reputation into federated
identity management is a contestable issue.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The current federation frameworks which attempt to
achieve identity federation have drawbacks and can not be
deployed in dynamic open environments. Underlying trust
models are too limited to establish trustworthiness between
entities, especially when it comes to interaction with previ-
ously unknown parties. The participants of a static Circle of
Trust excessively rely on pre-configured Trust Anchor List,
which means the trust relationship is established mostly in
business level. In this paper, we took the first step towards
developing a dynamic trust management model for federated
identity management. We developed a dynamic trust policy
language, which is based on ATNL and RT language. The
Dynamic Trust Model was proposed to allow untrusted SP
to join the existing CoT automatically by negotiation. We
showed the SATISFT function to implement the negotiation
via sending and receiving messages based on Web Service
Trust language.
In the future, we plan to develop a complex dynamic
trust model based upon DTM. In current time, DTM is
the first step, we only considered one identity provider in
particular CoT. However, the real world situation is much
more complicated with more than one identity provider
in a CoT, and the untrusted service providers sometimes
are authorized by other identity providers or delegators.
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Furthermore, we will address issues related to security and
privacy in dynamic open environment.
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